I. INTRODUCTION
The United States is in the midst of a historic drug overdose crisis. Each day, well over 100 Americans die of drug overdose, driven increasingly by street opioids.
1 Largely as a result of these deaths, overall life expectancy is steadily declining, and especially among certain groups of the American public-a trend seldom observed outside of conflict settings. 2 As deaths involving prescription painkillers have leveled off, the latest data on heroin and illicitly-manufactured Ultimately, PDMPs are here to stay. But deriving full value from effective public health surveillance without triggering unintended adverse consequences demands careful calibration. How do we decide what information must be collected? Who is able to access surveillance data? How are these data to be used? How must they be protected from undesired public and other disclosure? To answer these questions, the legal and bioethical canon is supposed to draw on a familiar balancing test: to weigh the state imperative to protect the public's health against the patients' individual privacy and confidentiality interests. 24 Supported by published and original empirical data, this article argues that surveillance efforts that fail to adequately safeguard patient data do much more than harm individual rights; by undermining patient trust and creating a system of perverse incentives, they can push patients away from seeking appropriate, timely help. At the population level, this hampers disease monitoring and control efforts, aggravating the very problems these policies and programs were intended to ameliorate. In other words, this policy heuristic fails to account for behavioral theory, sociolegal critique, and empirical evidence on the impact of public health 18 . See infra notes 211-21 and accompanying text; See also 
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surveillance programs. The article unfolds as follows: Part II provides an overview of public health surveillance systems, the positioning of patient confidentiality as a countervailing consideration to balance individual rights with community interests, and the role of ideology in shaping the design, legal posture, and implementation of such systems. It then situates PDMPs and their early evolution within this larger public health surveillance story. Part III brings this historical discussion to the present day by focusing specifically on the role of PDMPs within the overdose crisis. It then reviews current programmatic and legal posture of PDMPs, with focus on law enforcement access, criminal justice data integration, and the continued struggle to harmonize the law enforcement-driven design of prescription drug monitoring with its supposed public health mandate. Part IV reviews the available empirical evidence on PDMP impact and adds original qualitative empirical data, supported by emerging jurisprudence elevating privacy concerns about these systems. Finally, in Part V, I synthesize the preceding analysis by proposing changes to PDMP policies and programs that are informed by evidence rather than ideology and are designed to maximize the utility of these programs while minimizing their risk of considerable unintended consequences.
II. PUBLIC HEALTH SURVEILLANCE AND THE HEALTH CARE ENCOUNTER

A. Patient Privacy and Public Health Surveillance
We trust the information we share with our health care providers to be received in confidence and without judgment. 25 This is why the patient's right to confidentiality is fundamental to the provision of medical care. At its core, this right protects the deeply private information gathered in the course of medical encounters from disclosure to third parties without the patient's express consent; 26 the very fact that a patient has sought medical assistance typically comes under the scope of restricted information. 27 From the normative perspective, such protections derive their justification in patients' expectation of privacy, agency, and control over information (including 25 . Though the "do no harm" mantra is the most well-known element of the Hippocratic Oath, a less universally-known element of the declaration holds "sacred" any information learned in the course of medical practice. OXFORD TREASURY OF SAYINGS & QUOTATIONS 407 (Susan Ratcliffe ed., 4th ed. 2011) ("And whatsoever I shall see or hear in the course of my profession, as well as outside my profession . . . if it be what should not be published abroad. I will never divulge, holding such things to be holy secret."). Across the world, this normative and instrumental significance has overtime become codified by constitutional, statutory, and administrative protections, professional ethics rules, institutional policies, and an extensive canon from both domestic and international tribunals. For this international perspective, see generally, Declaration of Geneva, WORLD MED. ASSOC. (1948 28 This right is central to a bioethical and medical providers' professional responsibility framework designed to recalibrate the balance of power within the inherently unequal provider-patient relationship. 29 As it has been enshrined in bioethical canon, 30 the rights-based framing of confidentiality empowers patients to avail themselves of the unique trust understood to be at the core of the provider-patient relationship since ancient times. 31 Conversely, the absence of this trust-and the attendant sense of fear and pessimism 32 -further exacerbates the fundamental vulnerability of patients at the hands of medical providers.
The right to privacy and confidentiality also has vital instrumental value. Perceived or real confidentiality breaches erode the trust necessary for the provision of effective medical care. First, without confidence that their physical and mental health concerns and conditions will be held in secret, patients may delay or forgo essential services, with detriment to their health. 33 Second, the lack 28. One example is in help-seeking during overdose events. Laws in most (32, 64%) states now provide good Samaritan protections for victims and witnesses of such events in order to dispel fears of legal consequences from calling emergency medical assistance. 31. There is some debate as to whether the concepts of trust and a "rights-based" framework are in opposition to one another, but I agree with Mark Hall's conceptualization of these frameworks as completely compatible. 32. Hall, supra note 31, at 474 ("Trust consists of an optimistic attitude towards one's vulnerability, whereas distrust connotes an attitude of wariness or pessimism.").
33. For example, since medical and law enforcement emergency response is linked, many drug users and others who witness drug overdoses delay or forgo calling for professional help out of fear of adverse legal consequences. See of trust can produce dangerous gaps in patient-provider communication, whereby patients may misstate or omit important information. Such gaps can hamper appropriate diagnosis, treatment, and follow-up. 34 Third, the very presence or absence of trust in the patient-provider relationship has measurable therapeutic effects. 35 Likely related to the dynamics of the self-healing "placebo effect," the extent to which a patient perceives her provider as trustworthy and dependable can enhance the health benefit of the patient's treatment. 36 Conversely, unauthorized disclosure of sensitive patient information and associated stigmatization can cause a cascade of harm in physical and mental health, economic, family, social, and other dimensions.
37
Confidential medical care is not equally distributed. There is a growing, global body of empirical data documenting the disparities in systemic violations to confidentiality and other rights of patients belonging to marginalized groups. This includes ethnic minorities; 38 people living with HIV/AIDS; 39 people who use drugs;
40 and the poor. 41 Reflecting the power imbalance that affects these groups in other domains, confidentiality violations disproportionately impact these patients because they are subject to increased state control, surveillance, and stigmatization; 42 they also often lack access to both formal and informal mechanisms to vindicate their individual rights and to address privacy violations. 43 Effective flows of accurate information play a vital role in informing decisions on both the individual and community health. Given accurate information about the patient's symptoms, risk factors, and medical history, providers can combine their clinical judgment with the latest available research to make diagnostic and treatment decisions.
Despite its critical importance and deep philosophical roots, the right to patient privacy and confidentiality is nowhere absolute, as it must be balanced with community interests. 44 Common law and statutory limitations of this right are acknowledged, for example to control emerging diseases and other public health and disease surveillance activities, 45 and to prevent clear and present danger to the patient or to third parties. 46 International, national and local laws around the world reflect the imperative to balance community interests in health and safety with the individual patient's right to privacy. 47 Many jurisdictions mandate provider disclosure of confidential patient information in certain cases, including virulent infections, child abuse, and domestic violence. 48 But normative and legal protections generally require such disclosure to be narrowly tailored and delineated by safeguards, for example in ways that facilitate testing and treatment. 49 Data gleaned in the course of health care encounters also holds enormous 51 The aggregate sum of medical encounters forms a critical component of a society's public health defense-health care settings create a "sentinel surveillance" network to discern the prevalence of certain conditions and risk behaviors, track emerging health threats and offer a platform for prevention and intervention efforts. Only when armed with such information can governments mount timely and proportional responses to public health threats. 52 Thus, up-to-date data on where and how diseases spread and how best to control them are critical to drive state efforts to protect the public. Generating the best available evidence for individuals and populations requires a number of elements, with patient confidentiality being one of the most fundamental.
Yet, as with other forms of government surveillance, 5 3 these systems are prone to abuse. In the face of emerging public health threats (be they real or perceived), policymakers often respond by mounting expansive, intrusive monitoring. These invasive initiatives certainly affect individuals; the failure of policymakers to adequately protect patients' rights and confidentiality can generate adverse impacts on a population level. With concrete and consistent safeguards, individuals are typically willing to cede some measure of confidentiality for the benefit of the community. Conversely, lack of trust in health providers and concern about legal, social, and other consequences of unauthorized disclosure push risky practices and stigmatized diseases underground. Fear of disclosure of confidential health information to employers, family members, mass media, and law enforcement can create dangerous barriers to preventative care, emergency services, and other domains of health care. A real or perceived risk that confidential medical information may be used to inflict psychological, social, economic, or other harm acts as a direct disincentive to patients seeking professional help or being completely forthright during their 50 In special settings, such as schools, armed forces, or employer-sponsored health clinics, patients expect fewer privacy protections because of the intimate ties binding care providers with entities with an interest in private patient data.
56
Some of these settings are characterized by special links between health care providers and other third parties. Known as "dual loyalty," health care providers' split commitment or "simultaneous obligation to a patient and a third party" presents a number of challenges. 57 This includes obligations to third party payers, state actors, and other institutional parties. In most egregious cases, dual loyalty may lead to patient abuses and rights violations, such as coerced medical or mental health treatment. 58 Overall, balancing state, community, payer, and individual interests continues to be a hotly contested area, 59 and is highly dependent on a society's cultural, economic, and legal contours.
The U.S. has a long and complicated history of public health surveillance. Dating back to the early days of the republic and substantially evolving during the late 19 th and early 20 th centuries, public health surveillance systems have typically emerged in response to real or perceived public health crises, such as yellow fever. 60 Typically intended to identify emergent threats, target interventions and inform policy responses, they are also often conceptualized as deterrents to undesirable behavior. By and large, these monitoring and surveillance systems 54 . FAIRCHILD ET AL., supra note 49, at 510. 55. The recent Ebola crisis represents an example of how the lack of adequate protections for patient right for confidentiality can adversely impact public health. In many of the affected locales, cases of infection quickly became public knowledge, leading to devastating consequences to both individuals and their families and neighbors. In response, infected individuals were often hidden for the fear of being ostracized and did not seek help until it was too late and their caregivers had been put at an unnecessary risk of infection. have used health care encounters as their sentinel points of data collection, mandating providers to report confidential data without patient consent in instances of a whole range of instances ranging from suspected child abuse to gunshot wounds to sexually-transmitted diseases and, at one time, abortions.
61
Just as with other forms of government surveillance, public health surveillance can be both "vital to the maintenance of our welfare" and "a policy of rounding undesirable" citizens. 62 The history of mandated disclosure programs in the U.S. and elsewhere is marked by a steady march towards more comprehensive, systematic, and effective surveillance. The dual-edged view of surveillance also means that its development has been shaped by the parallel evolution of privacy as American "society's limiting principle," 63 especially its emergence as a normative consideration and legal construct in jurisprudence and political thought.
64
Throughout the decades, public health surveillance has periodically invoked privacy concerns, closely tied to the abuse, over-reach, and stigmatization it potentiated. 65 In instances exemplified by the vociferous advocacy of the Citizens' Council on Health Care against birth defect registries, such concerns may have been principally theoretical. 66 
B. PDMPs as a Tool of Public Health Surveillance
The emergence of prescription drug monitoring programs reflects the evolution of disease-related surveillance in the US. In fact, efforts to track prescription of potentially-addictive medications date back to the early 1900s, including legislation like the Harrison Narcotics Act, 73 which set minimum standards for recording and reporting prescription of certain opioid medications. Steeped in drug panics of the era with roots in anti-immigrant sentiment, 74 this legislation cemented federal government jurisdiction of prescription and pharmacy practice in the space that would become known as "controlled substances." 75 In the intervening years, 76 the tracking of prescription medications deemed at high risk of misuse was accomplished primarily through the requirement of a triplicate prescription form, with one form being given to the patient, another being retained on file with the pharmacy, and the third being sent to a relevant government agency. 
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The emergence of the early modern PDMP is also closely enmeshed with the passage of sweeping drug control reforms, especially federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA). 81 This law would also become the model state-level drug control framework. In 1970, Congress adopted this legislation with the express purpose of "conquer[ing] drug abuse and . . . control[ling] the legitimate and illegitimate traffic in controlled substances."
82 This framework aimed to establish a "comprehensive" system to control the supply of drugs deemed potentially addictive or otherwise able to be abused.
8 3 Critical to this closed system is the articulation of a schedule, which categorizes drugs based on potential for abuse, accepted medical use, and likelihood of psychological or physical dependence. 84 Overtime, the scope of state PDMP laws adopted federal or state CSA scheduling frameworks by training their surveillance efforts on specific drug schedules (typically schedules II-V).
During this same era, the construct of patient privacy and autonomy saw substantial expansion. Emerging jurisprudence, epitomized in the progression from Griswald v Connecticut in 1965 to Roe v Wade in 1973, cemented the evolving understanding of privacy's constitutional underpinnings. 85 Notably, both of these landmark privacy cases addressed disputes arising from highly-sensitive medical procedures, with Griswald specifically invoking the patient's autonomy in controlling their prescription drug choices.
86
This jurisprudence set expanded PDMP laws and programs on a collision course with the emergent constitutional conceptualization-and public yearning for-privacy rights. Spurred by anxiety about novel electronic database systems, this tension would come to a head in the watershed PDMP case Whalen v. Roe.
87
At issue in Whalen was the 1972 passage of a New York State (NYS) provision directing the Department of Health to electronically document basic information for any patient prescribed a Schedule II medication. 88 In contrast to existing NYS paper-based prescription reporting, the new system would enable more practicable data management and streamlined analytical capability. This novel capability was aimed at identifying possible cases of drug diversion among patients and flagging patterns of potential inappropriate practices among prescribers. 89 Notably, this reform was part of a broad array of legislation buoyed by a wave of "get tough" ideology on drugs, exemplified by the highly-punitive Rockefeller Drug Laws. law. They sought to set minor constraints to state police power to store and collate data using new computerized tools. One plaintiff-a mother-claimed she had taken her child off Ritalin to avoid him being "branded for life." 91 Other adult plaintiffs recounted foregoing pain medication for the fear of being "labelled an addict," especially disquieting at a time when Nixon's "public enemy Number One" rhetoric was stoking the War on Drugs.
92 After being initially upheld 93 the law was later struck down after the case was remanded on appeal.
94 Balancing low actual system utilization at the time of the trial with the law's potential to violate "the most sensitive physical and psychological sensibilities" of patient privacy, the court struck down the new PDMP law. 95 Bucking its favorable disposition in privacy jurisprudence, the Burger Court reversed. 96 It deemed weighing program value against possible privacy violations a legislative, not a judicial matter. Brushing off these existential considerations, the Court opined that the state police power entitled New York State to rationally "experiment with new techniques of [drug] control." 97 It further rationalized that the risk of harmful data disclosure through a subpoena was too "remote" to invalidate the entire state regulatory scheme-a scheme, it pointed out, analogous to two other states and any number of existing New York State patient reporting mechanisms.
98
By articulating that "privacy" has multiple meanings, and that case law relating to autonomy in decision making did not apply to all matters of confidentiality, 99 Whalen demarcated the limits of privacy-based objections to government surveillance in modern jurisprudence. Its broad recognition of state police power to collect and store large amounts of information formed the basis for controversial surveillance programs in the intervening decades. 100 In rejecting to implicate surveillance program utility and impact, the Court left the design and configuration of these surveillance programs generally (and PDMPs in particular) a difficult target for legal challenge. In the context of the ideological discourse that captivated legislatures during the dawn of the War on Drugs, this implicit endorsement set the stage for the later expansion and intensification of PDMPs in the context of the overdose crisis. 100. See FAIRCHILD ET AL., supra note 49 (describing the impact of Whalen and how upholding this public health surveillance as constitutional laid the groundwork for more extensive surveillance programs in later years), and at 246-50 (describing the social and political pressure following September 11, 2001 to increase national public health surveillance methods in order to prepare for bioterror attacks).
III. PDMPS IN THE AGE OF THE OVERDOSE CRISIS
Starting in around 2000, the US began to see steep increases in drug-related deaths, many involving opioid analgesics along with other depressants like benzodiazepines and alcohol. 101 This has evolved into one of most devastating public health crises in its recent history. After rising at around 10% per year between 1999 and 2006, the overdose rate precipitously accelerated to 18% between 2014 and 2016. Over 64,000 Americans were killed by drug overdose in 2016-an unprecedented increase of more than 300% since the turn of the century. 102 The death rate specifically attributable to synthetic drugs like fentanyl shockingly doubled just within a one-year period, from 2015 to 2016.
The grim toll of overdose-related death and disability is propelled primarily by opioids. A drug family that includes both prescription analgesics and street drugs like heroin, opioids contribute to an average of well over 100 Americans fatalities every day. The human toll of this crisis has impacted countless families, 103 communities, and businesses; its financial costs already number in tens-perhaps hundreds-of billions per year. 104 In order to understand this crisis, it is first useful to provide an overview of its key elements and evolution.
A. Opioid Overdose, Defined
Opioids kill by depressing the individual's central nervous system, which in turn slows respiration. 105 This process can take up to 90 minutes or longer. 106 In lay discourse, overdose is often conflated with opioid addiction. A small but significant (up to 8%) 107 (as "addiction" is referred to in clinical discourse), 108 translating to increasing prevalence of risky non-medical use, such as snorting or injecting crushed pills. Ultimately, it is not possible to ascertain what proportion of overdose victims would have met the diagnosis of severe substance use disorder. What we do know is that addiction is not the sole risk factor for a fatal overdose. Polydrug use, especially the kind of mixing of opioids with other depressants like benzodiazepines, vastly increases overdose risk; doubling with every illicit drug consumed in combination with opioids.
109
Another critical driver of risk for overdose is resuming drug use after periods of voluntary or forced abstinence.
110 Such abstinence could result from drug "detoxification" or other treatment, incarceration, or other factors. Upon resuming drug use, individuals' overdose risk skyrockets because of loss of tolerance to the drug; when an individual consumes a dose similar to what they had used prior to incarceration, the loss of tolerance can render that dose fatal. 111 In the case of incarceration, during the first month of re-entry, ex-prisoners' risk of overdose is magnitudes higher than the background rate. 112 The opioid antidote naloxone reverses the respiratory depression, reviving the victims regardless of setting.
113
Naloxone is a prescription medication, although states have adopted legal strategies to facilitate its lay distribution amidst calls to make this drug available over the counter. For decades, opioid overdose had been endemic in urban communities of color, pockets of deep poverty in Appalachia, and other limited settings. 115 Aside from periodic celebrity deaths and occasional spikes in fatalities among heroin users related to fluctuations in drug purity, overall prevalence of opioid overdose remained relatively constant; so did public apathy.
116 Stigma attached to illicit drug use and reinforced by criminal law-as well as class and racial prejudice-translated to the lack of any concerted public health response. This endemic phase of apathy would gradually come to an end as the sheer magnitude, geography and demographics-its "changing face"-would begin to attract the mainstream attention it now so consistently receives.
117
The commonplace story about the current overdose crisis-both among professional and lay observers-is a narrative based on what in Public Health is referred to as the "vector model of disease." Rooted in the customary public health concern with infection control, this theory frames opioid drugs as a contagion. As with a virus, exposure to the opioid supply carries a risk of disease and even death. 118 Similarly, opioid fatalities have rapidly spread regionally and even internationally in a short period of time. This framing helps explain the wide popularity of the term "epidemic" to describe a crisis.
The vector model narrative proceeds as follows: towards the end of the Twentieth Century, American medicine was shocked by a series of epiphanies about the appalling societal levels of under-treated pain. This launched a wellintentioned drive to improve its management. Pain became the "fifth vital sign" and its self-assessment was introduced as a measure of consumer satisfaction, with implications for health care facilities' ratings and accreditation.
119 A movement towards "patient-centeredness" also catalyzed health care providers' focus on patient comfort and satisfaction.
Sensing a business opportunity, several drug makers engaged in aggressive physician detailing and other marketing to assuage concerns about the risks of (2015 120 This included the creation of astro-turf "patient rights" groups that would use legitimate gaps in patient care to advance the agenda of the pharmaceutical industry. Some of these initiatives intentionally misled prescribers about risks by asserting, without much evidence, that new product formulations successfully minimized adverse side effects in treatment of chronic pain.
121
These developments drove a rapid expansion in the availability of opioid analgesics. Prescribers readily relied on these medications to treat all kinds of pain, including acute, chronic, and palliative indications. Prescriptions were often made for medication courses that were substantially longer than necessary-epitomized in the narratives featuring high school athletes receiving a thirty-day OxyContin supply for a sprained ankle. 122 In addition to those acting in good faith, a small proportion of providers established "pill mills," which issued opioid prescriptions with inadequate regard for the patients' actual medical need. As a result, the rate of opioid analgesic consumption more than tripled between 1999 and 2006 123 but leveled off and started to decline after 2011-2012. 124 With steep increases in exposure to these powerful depressants, the number of Americans experiencing accidental opioid poisonings began to grow. 125 This has been attributed to the inherent habit-forming properties of these drugs and to the poor understanding of how to properly balance appropriate pain care with the risk of addiction and overdose. Ultimately, the rising popularity of opioid analgesics was closely trailed by an upward curve in opioid overdose fatalities. 
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Around 2010, the second phase of the crisis began to take shape. After remaining stable for years, overdose deaths involving heroin spiked rapidly, tripling between 2010 and 2015.
127 The "vector model" associates this shift with rising rates of addiction among those taking opioid medications; once the users were exposed and seeking an ever-elusive high, prescription opioids would then act as a "gateway" to black market drugs, based on their ubiquitous availability and lower price relative to diverted prescription medications. This narrative is encapsulated in the often-cited statistic that "4 out of 5 new heroin users started with prescription drugs. 128 Starting in 2014, the crisis spiraled into its third phase. Black market drugs-including heroin and counterfeit pills-became increasingly adulterated with illicitly-manufactured synthetic opioids, mainly fentanyl analogues.
129 These substances can be clandestinely synthesized cheaply and with relative ease by anyone with the requisite knowledge of-and access to-chemical laboratory equipment. In the span of a single year, from 2014 to 2015, U.S. deaths attributed to fentanyl analogues spiked by over 72% to almost 10,000. 130 In an increasing number of locales, these clandestinely-manufactured synthetics now constitute the primary drivers of fatal opioid poisoning.
131
Under the vector model, the fault for this uncontained crisis falls principally-and almost exclusively-on the substances and their distributors. Were it not for the unenlightened or unscrupulous behavior by health care providers and drug companies, this line of logic suggests we would not be in the situation we are in today. This logic certainly applies to contaminated food products. 132 However, aside from their habit-forming properties, opioids provide, powerful relief to sufferers of physical and emotional pain-which is the reason they have remained a critical healing tool for centuries. 133 examination of the demographic, epidemiological and economic evidence limits the explanatory power of the vector model as it applies to the overdose crisis.
C. The Social Determinants Critique
Although it is a common refrain to say that the overdose crisis cuts across geographic and demographic fault lines, not all racial and economic groups have been uniformly affected. Areas and groups characterized by poverty, concentrated disadvantage, and poor economic opportunity have been noted to be at much higher risk. 134 These statistics readily point to more fundamental underlying causes of the crisis.
Modern Public Health embraces economic, social, and other "structural" factors as "social determinants" of health.
135 Central to the social determinants framework is the recognition of wide disparities in health.
136 Although some differences in health outcomes may be due to biological factors (for example, life expectancy differences between the sexes), observed differences in disease prevalence and life expectancy based on racial, class, geographical and other arbitrary characteristics vividly demonstrate the influence of structural factors.
137
In addition to clear links between poor health and low economic attainment, inequality in-and-of-itself appears to play a role in generating stress, substance misuse, and other disease-causing processes.
138
A deeper exploration of the relationship between structural determinants, pain, addiction, and overdose has been covered elsewhere 139 and is beyond the scope of this paper. What is critical to the discussion of the role of PDMPs in the response to the current crisis is that there is ample evidence pointing to the importance of social, economic, health care systems, and other factors as the drivers of drug use and overdose.
140 So, while the expansion in the availability of prescription analgesics certainly played a role in facilitating this crisis, an exclusive focus on that expansion misses its underlying root causes.
An emerging domain of demographic research into "diseases of despair" helps to better understand the broader phenomena that precipitated the current overdose emergency. Coined by Princeton economists Anne Case and Angus Deaton, this term refers to the interconnected trends in fatal drug overdose, alcohol-related disease, and suicide. to "diseases of despair" has seen an "extraordinary" and "unanticipated" rise previously rarely seen in times of peace. 141 Based substantially on these three causes of death, middle-aged white Americans without a bachelor's degree now have a lower life expectancy than their parents.
142 The "reversal of fortunes" 143 in life expectancy originally identified in underserved counties of Appalachia and the Southwest in the first decade of the 21st Century now characterizes the overall demographic trend for the United States.
144
Alcohol-related liver disease and-to a substantial degree-suicide are not directly attributable to the risks posed by opioid "overprescribing." Alarming trends in those realms challenge the centrality of opioid supply as the root cause of the overdose crisis.
145 Case and Deaton attribute these unprecedented demographic shifts to deterioration in economic and social factors, linked primarily to the stagnation in real wages, decline in economic opportunity, and the economic shocks following the 2008 financial crisis.
146 Ultimately, they argue, these drastic demographic shifts are linked to cumulative deprivation following a long-term process of decline. This has culminated in the loss of hope for a better future that has hit white working-class Americans especially hard. Austerity politics have accelerated these trends. 146. See id. This paper has not been peer reviewed, but it fits with a broader literature on "reversal of fortunes" for large swaths of US population in terms of health outcomes tied to economic and other factors. pressure to cut costs, governments on all levels of the U.S. federalist structure have failed to invest in prevention, basic services, and economic resilience.
14 8
They have also failed to address deep structural issues that have fueled the crisis, eroding perceived utility of collective responses to societal challenges. Paradoxically, this frustration propelled to victory politicians espousing increasingly more austere policies. 149 In view of the broader uncertainty, declining opportunity, and other societal stressors, opioids are singular in their ability to provide fast, effective, and relatively cheap analgesia, be it from physical and psychological trauma. If we recast "pain" as inclusive of economic stress, social isolation, and other structural trends, the role of opioids as symptomatic of neglected societal problems begins to come into focus. 150 Other, more proximal structural contributors to the opioid crisis are also clearly important. This includes the architecture and function of the health care system. Far beyond merely acting as a potential source of harmful exposure to opioid drugs, health care can have a protective effect against precursors to opioid misuse and overdose; this includes provision of effective and accessible pain care, mental health care, and risk-reduction interventions for individuals with substance use disorder. 151 Yet, the U.S. health care system and its providers are unprepared to meet many of these challenges. Utilization of psychoactive medications other than opioids--including benzodiazepines--has literally skyrocketed in the last two decades, underscoring over-reliance on risky pharmacotherapy to address complex psychosocial challenges.
152
Limited physician understanding of substance use disorder is well-documented: very few providers receive adequate training in this realm (although this may be changing). 153 Substance use screening and other risk reduction interventions are not systematic and may be disincentivized by insurance architecture, lack of enforcement of legal mandates such as mental health and substance use coverage parity, and other financial and handing Republican control of all three branches of the federal government, along with the overwhelming majority of governorships and state legislatures). In addition, geographical barriers, inadequate health insurance coverage, and uneven distribution of medical resources may influence access to pain management services, preventative care, and substance use treatment.
Id. See also DAVID STUCKLER & SANJAY BASU, THE BODY ECONOMIC: WHY AUSTERITY KILLS (Basic Books 2013
156
Technical features like insurance pre-authorization requirements, coverage limitations, and provider compensation rates can substantially shape what care is provided, and to whom.
157 Gaps in care can induce self-medication (for pain, as well as for drug withdrawal symptoms) and contribute to overdose risk. For instance, nationwide, access to evidence-based substance use treatment-a critical tool in the fight against opioid overdose-is available only to an estimated onein-ten patients who require it. 158 In about one third of US states, including some of the hardest-hit jurisdictions, state Medicaid policies prohibit coverage of methadone-a lifesaving maintenance medication that can cut overdose risk by over 50%. 159 The extent to which these and other protective functions of health care are accessible, appropriate, affordable, and of high quality are critical determinants of opioid overdose risk.
Finally, the demand for pain relief is often a function of the individual's overall health. Consider the example of obesity. Individuals who meet the definition of obesity are much more likely to suffer from other chronic health 154 problems, including chronic pain. 160 Rates of "overweight" and obesity have skyrocketed among Americans in the last four decades. 161 Today, two thirds of American adults are overweight or obese.
162
Among well-documented "obesogenic" factors are the individual's nutritional, informational, and built environment. 163 To the extent that being overweight elevates one's vulnerability to acute and chronic pain, the numerous environmental elements operative in obesity may factor into the structural equation for the overdose crisis.
Although far from exhaustive, this overview of the "structural determinants" framework helps illuminate the reality that the conditions for the overdose crisis have deep, tangled roots. Only in embracing this complexity can we hope to craft appropriate, multi-pronged responses. To date, this conceptualization has seldom informed the solutions and interventions that have been advanced to curb the crisis.
D. The Role of PDMPs in Overdose Crisis Response
Broadly speaking, the opioid crisis illustrates the folly of employing simple solutions to address complex problems. The crisis' origins implicate health care providers' over-reliance on opioid therapy for a broad set of health problems. In many cases, especially those involving patients with complex interactions of physical and mental health needs, opioids became an attractive go-to response to a range of physical and mental health complaints, for which a highlypersonalized and resource-intensive course of treatment would have been more appropriate. 164 This resulted in temporarily assuaging patient symptoms and claiming success in metrics such as patient satisfaction surveys. Over time, however, it became clear that the failure to apply more intensive and caseappropriate care up front caused considerable downstream complications. 165 On the policy level, reducing the supply of prescription medications to solve the overdose crisis offers an analogous mirage of a simple solution to a complex challenge. This parallel appears to be lost on key decision-makers tasked with addressing the crisis. As deaths involving prescription painkillers have leveled off, the latest data on opioid-related fatalities could not be more dire. These 166 doubling just between 2010 and 2012. 167 They have experienced another, even more shocking recent spike, largely related to fatalities caused by illicitly-manufactured fentanyl. 168 This is because the trends in prescription painkiller and heroin use are linked. There is substantial evidence 169 to suggest that the crisis is being fueled by the crackdown on painkillers like OxyContin and Vicodin. Shuttering pill-mills, tightening restrictions on certain analgesics, and making products harder to snort and inject seem to be curbing prescription drug use. 170 But addiction does not simply go away when the pills do, which is why people dependent on prescription opioids have been switching to heroin in record numbers.
171 From a chemical standpoint, heroin is very similar to its prescription drug cousins. Its uncontained black market availability, increasing adulteration with the potent synthetics, and association with injection drug use make heroin a much more risky substance of choice. 172 Troubling emerging data indicate that an increasing proportion of users are now initiating opioid use with heroin, not with particular prescription drugs. 173 These data underscore the fundamental reality that slashing opioid prescribing is unlikely to result in marked reductions INDIANA HEALTH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:139 in overdose morbidity and mortality; 174 unless we address the underlying health and structural factors driving demand, efforts to curb supply will simply result in an increasingly morbid game of whack-a-mole.
Nevertheless, to date, much of the discourse on the crisis continues to emphasize opioid supply. The zeal for supply reduction policies and programs has withstood a growing body of empirical and theoretical critique, much of which suggests that the application of these interventions was doing more harm than good. 175 From the very early days of the overdose crisis, PDMPs have served as the central feature in this ideologically-driven supply reduction paradigm. PDMPs are now prominently featured 176 by government agencies on all levels as a key weapon in the fight against the mounting overdose toll. If only we could get more prescribers and pharmacists to use these databases-the accepted wisdom goes-the overdose crisis could subside.
177
This logic has spurred broad exuberance about the potential role of PDMPs as a near-panacea in US response to the crisis, leading to the rapid expansion in the number, scope, and intensity of these programs. As of 2018, all fifty states and the District of Columbia authorized PDMPs, up from only fourteen in 2000 (See Figure 1) .
178 These systems are increasingly interoperable, thanks in part to federal grants authorized through the National All Schedules Prescription Electronic Reporting Act (NASPER), as well as through other sources.
179
Interoperability is moving this patchwork ever-closer to a fully national PDMP infrastructure conceptualized by NASPER (but never funded by Congress). 
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Theoretically, the creation of uniform and interoperable systems tracking prescription drug use creates the potential of benefit on a number of levels. Such systems could play an important patient care function, including preventing dangerous drug interactions, monitoring medication adherence, streamlining care coordination among various providers, and identifying patients in need of additional care or services. In terms of their public health surveillance function, PDMPs can help understand the prevalence and incidence of use of certain drugs, track unexpected or adverse events, and target resources and interventions to patients and geographical areas most in need. The Centers of Disease Control lists many of these ideal functions and uses in its public guidance for the utilization of PDMPs.
181 But what is the actual express purpose stated by the programs themselves? Reflecting the fact that PDMPS first emerged as tools of law enforcement, many continue to characterize their main function as to identify possible prescription drug misuse and diversion; 182 this primarily addresses "doctor shopping" whereby a patient receives prescriptions from a number of different doctors for the exact same condition. In a systematic national analysis of language PDMPs use to describe their own goals and functions, this "Supply Reduction-Punitive" orientation was near-universal, with 83% of the forty-one analyzed programs. 183 Depending on a jurisdiction, additional goals such as balancing medication access, improving access to drug treatment, and supporting clinical decision making are also featured among the stated aims. 184 Demand reduction, mostly related to using PDMP data to facilitate patient access to substance use treatment was invoked by 51% of the programs. 185 Less than half (49%) mentioned public health functionality and goals. 186 Remarkably, 62% of the PDMP in this study did not so much mention overdose prevention in their public-facing materials.
187
In terms of their legal and institutional structure, the national PDMP landscape is heterogeneous along a number of parameters. Many PDMPs (20, 39%) now reside in Departments of Health, though a significant minority (6, 12%) continue to be operated by law enforcement or justice agencies. 188 Since none of the programs reside within healthcare institutions, they are not covered Figure 1) Programs vary in the scope of controlled substances coverage. Most (36, 70%) track all five schedules. 190 Although it is not a controlled substance under the federal schedule, proposals have been made to integrate naloxone--the opioid antidote--among tracked medications. 191 Other drugs increasingly implicated in polysubstance use with opioids are being advanced as candidate for PDMP tracking. 192 It is important to underscore that this record-keeping constitutes much more than just highly-dangerous narcotic or amphetamine drugs. Schedules within the federal and state CSAs are expansive, which means that PDMPs engage in sweeping data collection sometimes seemingly disconnected from their stated purpose. For instance, this surveillance includes prescription hormones used in gender transition therapy (classified under Schedule III).
193
To improve system utilization, states have also adopted a number of mandates that prescribe the situations when providers must register for and access the PDMP. 194 For instance, Massachusetts mandates all newly-licensed prescribers to be registered in the system, and has instituted an effort to register existing 194. Sixteen states require prescribers to access the PDMP. While all these states require a PDMP check before prescribing to a new patient, other mandates are also in place, varying by state: every time a prescription is started for longer than seven days, every six months that a patient is on a continuous opioid prescription, anytime a provider prescribes a Schedule II or III drug, or anytime a provider prescribes an opioid or benzodiazepine. providers as part of their continuing medical education. 195 It also requires health care providers to consult its MassPat system each time they prescribe any Schedule II substance. 196 Every new patient presenting to a Massachusetts prescriber triggers a mandatory PDMP assessment. 197 Nationally, an increasing number of states are adopting similar provisions. 198 States legislatures have recognized patient privacy concerns by erecting a variety of protections to safeguard highly-personal data collected by precritpion surveillance systems. These PDMP privacy protections vary widely, but often include a definition of the circumstances and authorization required for each querying party. For instance, a substantial number (15, 29%) require in-state law enforcement to present a warrant, (25, 49%) require a certification of an active investigation, and (45, 88%) require a subpoena to access PDMP data.
199 For outof-state law enforcement, a substantial number (13, 25%) require a warrant or a judicially-approved show of probable cause. 200 Conversely, the overwhelming majority of programs (39, 76%) either compel or permit PDMPs to transmit data on suspicious activity to law enforcement.
201
This context has a number of implications for the public health value and potential unintended impact of PDMPs. First, though heterogeneous in their precise design and legal posture, the majority of PDMPs currently allow warrantless law enforcement access. 202 In states where access is contingent upon the presence of an "active investigation" or "probable cause," PDMPs systems may run searches and deploy "predictive" algorithms that trigger investigations, functionally circumventing these access requirements.
203
Broad law enforcement access to some of the most private health information creates a number of problems, including blurring the line between healthcare and law enforcement. 204 It risks further stigmatization, deterring patients from INDIANA HEALTH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:139 accessing appropriate medications or seeking help for problematic substance use. This disproportionately impacts those groups with a history of discrimination and exclusion in healthcare settings, including people who inject drugs, racial minorities, trans and sexual minority patients.
205
These concerns are not unique to the deployment of PDMPs. Even elsewhere in the health care arena, observers have critiqued the advent of algorithms, artificial intelligence analytical tools and other "big data" techniques whose cavalier adoption did not adequately consider the data quality, practical, or ethical implications of these systems. 206 More in line with the law enforcement roots of PDMPs, however, are the growing concerns about "predictive policing," "gang database" and other algorithmic systems increasingly used by security agencies.
207
These critiques have focused on assumptions of questionable empirical, ethical, or legal value that, when codified into algorithms, perpetuate injustice and misapplication of resources. An emerging trend in PDMP design and authority underscores more overt stigmatizing potential of these systems. It involves PDMP provision of criminal justice information, specifically drug conviction or charge data, to prescribers and dispensers. The State of Wisconsin requires law enforcement agencies to report drug-related violations, opioid overdoses or deaths, and prescription drug diversion incidents to the PDMP, integrating those data with the patient's prescription information. Similarly, Kentucky requires the Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC) to communicate drug conviction data to its PDMP. 209 The stand-alone Diversion Alert program in Maine provides data on drug-related criminal charges to health care providers. 210 Now that we understand the landscape, what is the evidence on the impact of these programs? The next section addresses this.
IV. PDMPS IMPACT ON THE OVERDOSE CRISIS
A. Review of the Available Evidence
What is known about the impact of PDMPs on the overdose crisis? When it comes to tracking diversion of medications, curbing their misuse, and reducing "doctor shopping," the evidence on PDMPs has been characterized as "mixed and inconclusive."
211
More fundamentally, however, determining "success" of PDMPs is predicated first and foremost on how success is defined and measured. When PDMPs are assessed, the outcomes of interest tend to closely reflect the "epidemic" framing of the overdose crisis as a vector-driven problem, with "overprescription" at its root and supply reduction its most promising remedy. This framing helps explain why most of the research published this decade focuses narrowly on the relationship between PDMP policies or programs and indicators closely aligned with opioid supply (see Table 1 ). When assessing the thirty-four peer-reviewed empirical studies of PDMP impact from 2010 onwards, most (71%, twenty-one of thirty-four studies; see Table 1 ) focused on outcomes such as the frequency, volume and durations of prescriptions.
2 1 2 interest scrutiny and systematic analyses of algorithms. Sandvig adapts the social scientific audit study to offer potential research methodologies for an "algorithm audit", intended to provide researchers with the tools to identify, analyze and hold accountable discriminatory and problematic algorithms Substantially fewer evaluations have focused in the public health realm, with (6%, two of thirty-four studies) opioid-related treatment admissions 220 and opioid overdose mortality 221 (32%, eleven of thirty-four studies).
In addressing the current crisis, measuring PDMP success primarily through study endpoints like reductions in prescribing volume 2 22 and suppression of multiple-prescriber episodes ("doctor shopping" in colloquial parlance) is problematic. Such narrow definitions of effectiveness mask the complexities of addressing overdose and addiction on the systems level.
2 2 3 It is not clear to what extent outcomes such as prescribing volume 224 can serve as an appropriate "surrogate" endpoint for research in the realm of PDMP public health impact. 225 Ongoing debate about the appropriate use of surrogate endpoints in clinical trials 226 helps to inform this debate. Just like it may be inappropriate to use an intermediate biological marker as evidence that a drug may improve cancer survivorship, 227 it may not in fact be appropriate to use declines in opioid prescribing rates as a metric of progress in the effort to address population-level overdose morbidity and mortality. This is especially true because nationally, as well as on a more granular jurisdictional level, reductions in prescribing have not systematically resulted in statistically significant drops in overdose rates. 228 If the ultimate goal is to curb overdose, then PDMPs' utility is far from clear. 231 Our review found that only 32% (eleven of thirty-four) 232 of the relevant empirical studies even included overdose morbidity or mortality as a metric of PDMP impact, despite this outcome clearly being the policy goal of primary-if not sole-importance. Of those studies that assessed PDMP impact in this vital arena, all eleven considered prescription drug related overdoses as a metric of interest. Among these studies, six found PDMP deployment to be associated with lower prescription drug overdose rates, 233 and five reported a null result.
234
More recent research continues to bear characteristically mixed results. In an analysis of programs nationwide, Patrick et al. 235 found an average reduction of 1.12 prescription opioid-related overdose deaths per 100,000 population in the year after a state's implementation of a prescription monitoring program. But this analysis did not control for key confounders, like state medical marijuana policies. 236 Pardo, for example, 237 found that states with more intensive PDMP programs saw a reduction in prescription drug overdoses; however, when controlling for covariates, they found that states with medical marijuana dispensaries reported a 16% reduction in in prescription drug overdose deaths.
Ultimately, PDMP evaluation research should not be limited to measuring only overdose morbidity and mortality linked only to prescription drugs. Given widespread misclassification of opioid overdose deaths, 238 as well as the fungibility of the opioid use and documented transition from prescription to black market drugs, the most appropriate metric of success would be to consider PDMP impact on all opioid-involved overdoses, including prescription and nonprescription sources. In this review, only one in five published peer-reviewed studies (21%; see Table 1 ) included an overdose morbidity or mortality-related research endpoint that was not specific to prescription drugs. 239 Of those, three found PDMP deployment to be associated with lower overall overdose rates, 240 while four reported a null result. 241 Notably, three studies reported PDMP program or policy elements to be associated with a rise in non-prescription overdose rates. 242 These decidedly equivocal findings stand to challenge the kind of unbridled enthusiasm, generous investment, and cavalier policy emphasis that has buoyed PMDPs since the onset of the overdose crisis.
Insofar as the PDMP tracks reductions in doctor shopping or other drug user behavior deemed "problematic," those observations may reflect health care providers' and drug users' defensive practices, rather than real improvements. Providers may rebuke, abandon, and "fire" patients with suspicious or in some way aberrant histories or behaviors, as a defensive tactic to reduce their exposure to potential professional and criminal liability. 243 An evolving trend in highprofile cases where prescribers are being held criminally responsible for the overdose deaths of their patients 244 use are insufficiently strict. 251 The problem isn't even that over-reliance on PDMPs may, at times, paradoxically increase prescription 252 of painkillers. The key issue is that PDMPs are designed only to generate information. What ultimately matters is how that information is used, and by whom.
Without adequate context and transparency between patients and providers about their own information stored on PDMPs, patients stabilized on high doses of opioids are increasingly concerned about the future their pain management care. 253 Currently, such patients have no right to review their own PDMP data, thus having no recourse to challenge or correct discrepancies in their prescription history that may be misconstrued as substance misuse or "drug-seeking behavior." 254 This imbalance of power is especially concerning in the context of law enforcement accessing sensitive medical records: what criteria are based to distinguish between substance misuse emblematic of addiction, bona fide pain care, and venal diversion? The lack of agency for patients to review-and correct-their own records may sew distrust among the patient community.
Withholding prescriptions and abandoning or "firing" complex or suspicious patients appear to be actions that may result from finding of unexpected information in PDMPs. These actions may push patients away from the health care system, precipitating stigmatization and multiple cascading health harms. If "problem" patients are rebuked and turned away, they will likely seek out blackmarket alternatives-typically heroin, and increasingly, illicit fentanyl. Even when practitioners do refer patients to treatment, many of the affordable, evidence-based programs have waitlists that are weeks-or months-long, 255 leaving patients with few options in the meantime. In other words, without health INDIANA HEALTH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:139 care providers adequately understanding how to use information gleaned from PDMPs to simultaneously reduce prescription drug misuse and keep patients engaged in care, the increased use of PDMPs can cause more harm than good. Public health surveillance can act as an intervention, changing behavior of those affected as well as other members of the community. In the case of PDMPs, these programs engage in disseminating information and providing training to a variety of stakeholders, including law enforcement and health care providers. Empirical analysis found little evidence that PDMPs were using their online channels to educate its users and members of the public that were likely to reduce overdose or advance other public health goals. Most programs provide didactic aides but do not provide substantive training.
256
Evaluation of the Diversion Alert program in Maine underscores this point. This program provides health care practitioners with access to a database and alert system that contains criminal justice information about their patients. 257 Its evaluation found that system access was associated with increased deployment of patient surveillance methods, including urine drug screens, random pill counts, and utilization of prescription drug monitoring program.
258
The broader context for this empirical overview is that there is little evidence that interventions to reduce drug supply have any lasting positive impact on substance misuse or overdose. 259 As has been the case with the vast majority of supply-reduction efforts mounted by the criminal justice system, the development of PDMPs occurred largely without regard for empirical insights into how regulated entities may alter their behavior in response. The engineers of PDMP interventions did not appear to contemplate how patients would react to the real or perceived risk of breach of their confidential prescription information, or to being rebuked by a provider in response to information gleaned from the PDMP. Much was assumed about how providers' access and interpretation of prescription drug information can reduce inappropriate prescribing and diversion of drugs; doing so without unnecessarily restricting access to medication for bona fide patients received little consideration.
B. Original Data
Original data collected as part of a larger project helps to contextualize these findings. We conducted twenty-three interviews with key stakeholders in Massachusetts regarding their perspectives and experiences with the prescription 256 260 The full description of the study is beyond the scope of this paper, but several data points help to underscore a number of the shortcomings in PDMP design and implementation.
Two of the stakeholder groups interviewed during the project included healthcare providers and advocates for the substance user community. Interviewees from both stakeholder groups expressed overlapping concerns regarding the PDMPs effect on patient-physician relationships, the unintended harms of surveillance on prescribing practices and the failure of the PDMP design to provide support for patients with addiction. An advocate from a community organization for substance users suggested the PDMP does not play a major role in "curbing the epidemic" and may be responsible for increasing the use of illicit drug use:
I really don't see it playing much a role. I think it may have played an unintended role of more people accessing what substances they choose to use illegally. I think there are a lot of folks out there who are in legitimate pain and because they aren't being treated properly for that pain, they have been accessing the medications and chemicals they need to make themselves feel better in an illicit and illegal way now, because of the PDMP. Drug user group representative 261 As this stakeholder suggested, the PDMPs "supply-reduction" design offers little opportunity for patients and providers to reduce the "demand" for pain medication, potentially diverting patients towards illicit drug use through limitations on prescription medication.
Another dominant theme in these narratives was the role of PDMPs as potentially furthering existing stigmatization of drug users in health care and pharmacy settings.
A lot of people stay away from certain healthcare facilities or companies or whatever and because, they, of the way, the way they've begun targeting us and treating us in terms of, as using the PMP as a tool of oppression.
Drug user group representative 262
This perspective highlights the potential of PDMPs as a real or perceived barrier to help-seeking. Such adverse impact could disproportionately impact individuals whose mistrust of government surveillance is based on personal or social group experiences warranting such caution. The dominant narrative from physicians was somewhat parallel to the community groups' perspective, in the sense that prescribers critiqued the effect of the PMDP on patient-physician relationships and their ability as providers to effectively treat pain and addiction, the root causes of opioid "demand", with one prescribing physician stating:
I think physicians currently believe that their prescribing practices are now vulnerable to being monitored and unlike other aspects of their care and their treatment, how they prescribe to a given patient is there for everybody to see, however the reasons that they prescribed it, the carefulness with which they're monitoring, the effectiveness that it may have for the patient, that's not there.
Prescribing physician 263 
C. Concerns Emerging from Litigation
Another important source of information about the real-world impact of PDMPs comes from emerging litigation, based specifically on privacy concerns.
The recently-decided Oregon Prescription Drug Monitoring Program and the ACLU Foundation of Oregon v. United States Drug Enforcement Administration
264 case is especially illustrative of the privacy issues raised by the new or newly expanded PDMPs, as they have emerged to combat the overdose crisis.
At issue in this case is the Oregon PDMP law, which requires law enforcement to obtain a warrant supported by probable cause to access prescription data. The DEA routinely seeks data from state PDMPs using only an administrative subpoena. Oregon challenged this practice. Joining the lawsuit were ACLU of Oregon and five individuals, including four patients and one prescribing physician. Two of the John Doe interveners were transgender men, whose hormone transition therapy was documented in the PDMP. In their declarations, these five individuals communicated their misgivings about the nearly unfettered availability of deeply-private PDMP data to federal agents, and the effect that is likely to have on their physical and mental health and prescribing behavior. 265 They objected to the law on Fourth Amendment grounds. After prevailing below, the challenge to warrantless access advanced to the 9th Circuit. On appeal, Oregon lost. The Court reasoned that the Oregon law was in positive conflict with the federal CSA, and was therefore preempted: it also reasoned that the intervenors lacked standing because "threatened injury must be certainly impending to constitute injury in fact, and . . . 
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future injury are not sufficient." 266 The state elected not to appeal the case further. The parallel case DOJ v. Utah Department of Commerce reached a similar conclusion, though that opinion did reach-and rejected-the Fourth Amendment question on the expectation of privacy, based on third party doctrine. 267 Notably, the decision states "Physicians and patients have no reasonable expectation of privacy in the highly-regulated prescription drug industry." 268 This decision was similarly not appealed.
Although these decisions technically constitute the law only in the 9th and 10th Circuits, they are certain to have national impact. Across the country, PDMP legislation includes a warrant requirement for law enforcement in 27 states. 269 The broad subpoena power granted to the Department of Justice through the CSA essentially means that federal law enforcement is able to obtain PDMP information without judicial review, extinguishing state-level protections as they apply to DEA and other federal agents. Moreover, there is nothing stopping federal agents from subsequently transferring data gleaned from warrantless PDMP searches to state or local law enforcement. This would certainly be in line with routine coordination and data sharing between federal, state, and local law enforcement in all aspects of drug law enforcement. This mechanism is in addition to the other "back door" which is the proactive PDMP reporting of "outlier" information authorized or mandated in thirty-nine states. 270 
V. HARNESSING PDMPS TO ADDRESS THE OVERDOSE CRISIS
The preceding analysis carries key lessons for ways in which PDMP policies and programs can move towards evidence and away from ideology. As they now exist, and especially in view of the recent jurisprudence, the privacy issues may have a disproportionate impact on marginalized patients. It is not that the data are being collected, it is how these data are being used and who has access. In this, emerging concerns echo not just the past objections to public health surveillance but also current debates about dragnet government surveillance and "big data" techniques increasingly used for marketing and surveillance purposes. 271 Historical experience should prompt us to think critically about PDMPs and proceed with caution. Spurred by the opioid crisis, the evolution of PDMPs has [Vol. 15:139 occurred without adequate attention to informed, user-driven design to maximize PDMPs' clinical and public health benefits, while minimizing their potential harms. As currently configured, there is little reason to believe that PDMPs increase the use of proven overdose prevention measures; there is even some evidence they may drive patients away from engagement with the health care system. 272 People with history of criminal justice involvement may be especially reticent to seek help if they perceive risk of law enforcement involvement. Many of the same individuals may also face much higher risk of overdose. 273 As the overdose crisis is driving the expansion of their operational and legal scope, these systems are being deployed with without adequate consideration of patient privacy and confidentiality. While their deterrence impact has not been adequately assessed, the potential for-and troubling signs of-unintended public health harms add urgency to a better calibration of the design and implementation of these programs. 274 There are clear opportunities for improvement, along several fronts. First and foremost, PDMPs can and should be functionally reconfigured away from their current orientation on arbitrary metrics of "aberrant" practices to instead focus on health promotion as their express policy and evaluation guidepost. The conceptual, normative, and operational goal of PDMPs must be to advance patient well-being. This implies the imperative to improve their ability to support sound clinical decision-making, 275 including through common-sense choice architecture elements protective against opioid-benzodiazepine and other risky drug interactions within a patient's pharmacotherapy regimen. Algorithms can be deployed to assist providers in identifying patients who are especially vulnerable to overdose risk. Instead of facilitating isolation and abandonment of at-risk individuals, these systems have the potential to facilitate engagement with improved physical and mental health care, including substance use treatment and other risk reduction modalities, such as naloxone access and syringe access services.
Simple design modifications can turn, PDMP into tools of patient care coordination, for example by integrating internal messaging platforms that could
